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Liens: Federal Tax Liens and Oklahoma Homestead
Prompt and certain collection of federal tax is essential to the maintenance
of the nation. For this reason, Congress has given the federal government a
formidable arsenal of collection tools. If a person fails to pay his federal tax
liability, the Commissioner may pursue one of three methods for collection':
he may bring suit for the unpaid amount, and, upon obtaining a judgment,
exercise the usual rights of a judgment creditor;2 he may proceed by the sum-
mary method of distraint and levy against the taxpayer's nonexempt property
and sell it to satisfy the amount of assessment; 3 or he may proceed by court
action to enforce the tax lien, which attaches to the delinquent taxpayer's
property." Allowing the federal government to reach a delinquent taxpayer's
property seems justified because the person has failed or refused to contribute
his share to the maintenance of the country.
Often, however, a delinquent taxpayer owns an interest in property con-
currently with a nondelinquent third party. The third party, who has paid his
tax, should not lose his property simply because a co-owner has failed to do
so. Yet, attaching and selling the property may be the only method by which
the federal government can ever collect the delinquent liability. This raises an
interesting conflict between two imperatives: collecting federal taxes and pro-
tecting state-created property rights.
The conflict is especially pointed when the interest owned by a non-
delinquent third party is a state-created homestead. 5 Homestead laws vary
from state to state, but they all have the same general purpose of promoting
the security of the home by protecting the homestead property from the con-
sequences of a homeowner's economic misfortune., Pursuant to a public
policy that opposes pauperizing widows and children, states withdraw certain
properties from creditors' reach.7 The federal government, however; is not
an ordinary creditor. 8 Therefore, when the interests protected by tax collec-
tion laws conflict with the interests protected by state homestead laws, the
former will generally prevail.
When the federal government seeks property of a delinquent spouse that is
encumbered with a homestead interest claimed by a nondelinquent spouse, a
variety of situations may result. The resolution of the conflict requires an
1. J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 302 (2d ed. 1973).
2. See also CHOMMNI, supra note 1, at 910; I:R.C. §§ 7401, 7402 (1982).
3. CHOMMIE, supra note 1, at 910; I.R.C. §§ 6331-6340 (1982).
4. CHOMMIE, supra note 1, at 910; I.R.C. §§ 6321, 7403 (1982).
5. The federal homestead law exempts from debts lands homesteaded from the public do-
main until the issue of a patent therefore, while state homestead laws authorize the head of the
family to designate property to be exempt from future debts. Thus there are two distinct forms
of homestead legislation. 4A THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1932, at 196 (J. Grimes ed. 1979).
6. Id. at 199.
7. Id. at 200.
8. The Internal Revenue Service has been said to derive its creditor position from the con-
stitutional mandate to "lay and collect taxes." United States v. Pilla, 711 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1983)
(citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983)).
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understanding of the federal tax lien and a determination of the nature of the
respective homestead interest.
Federal Tax Lien
If a person refuses to pay taxes, or fails to pay through neglect, a lien in the
amount of the unpaid taxes may arise in favor of the United States govern-
ment. Three prerequisites must be met.9 First, there must be an assessment
for tax." Assessment is merely a recordation of the acknowledged tax
liability1 on a list kept in the Internal Revenue Service Regional Service
Center.'2 Second, there must be a demand for payment.II By statute, the Ser-
vice is required to make a demand as soon as practicable after assessment
and, in any event, within sixty days.' Third, the taxpayer must fail to pay
through refusal or neglect.' 5
Upon the occurrence of these events, a lien in the amount of the unpaid
taxes automatically arises, by statute, in favor of the United States govern-
ment. 6 The lien is valid against the delinquent taxpayer regardless of whether
it is filed of record. 7 The lien mandatorily attaches to all property or rights
to property, real or personal, belonging to the taxpayer."
Once the lien arises the federal government may enforce the lien by filing a
civil action in a federal district court.' 9 In this proceeding, any property in
which the delinquent taxpayer has any right, title, or interest may be subject
to foreclosure in order to satisfy the tax liability. 20 If others persons have a
lien upon the same property, or claim an interest therein, they are made a
party to the action.2'
9. W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 11 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as PLUMB].
10. Assessment for taxes is made pursuant to I.R.C. § 6203 (1982).
11. A taxpayer acknowledges a tax liability when he files a return showing tax liability in ex-
cess of remittances. PLUMB, supra note 9, at 11.
12. I.R.C. § 6203 (1982). See also United States v. Coson, 286 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1961).
Assessment may also be based upon a determination of additional tax by the Internal Revenue
Service. Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAX. L. REv. 247 (1957).
13. Demand for payment is the event that causes the lien to take effect. However, technical-
ly, the lien arises upon assessment and, upon demand, it relates back to the date of assessment. 9
J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 54.40, at 139 (rev. ed. 1982).
14. I.R.C. § 6303 (1982); PLUMB, supra note 9, at 11. However, a belated demand will ap-
parently suffice. Id. at 13, citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6303-1(a) (1954). Also, the demand need not
be a written demand. PLUMB, supra at 14.
15. Any failure to pay may be regarded as refusal or neglect. 9 MERTENS, supra note 13, §
54.38, at 127.
16. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982).
17. 9 MERTENS, supra note 13, § 54.40, at 140. See also PLUMB, supra note 9, at 10.
However, the lien will not be valid against any purchaser, holder of a security interest,
mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor until it has been filed. Even after filing, the lien will
not affect ten delineated claims. See I.R.C. § 6323(b) (1982). See also 9 MERTENS, supra note 13,
§ 54.42.
18. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982); United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971); United States v.
Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
19. I.R.C. § 7403(a) (1982).
20. Id.
21. I.R.C. § 7403(b) (1982).
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After all parties are notified of the action, the court proceeds to adjudicate
all matters involved and determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon
the property.22 When the court determines that the federal government has a
claim or interest in the property, it may order that the property be sold and
the proceeds be distributed among the parties according to their respective in-
terests as determined by the court.23
In United States v. Rodgers,24 the Supreme Court set forth guidelines for
the application of section 632125 and section 740326 in situations where third
parties claim an interest in property concurrently with a delinquent taxpayer.
The government's lien under section 6321 mandatorily attaches to any pro-
perty in which a delinquent taxpayer owns an interest, regardless of other
concurrent owners. 27 However, the lien cannot extend beyond the delinquent
taxpayer's interest.28 Although the government cannot ultimately collect
more than the value of the taxpayer's interest, section 7403 gives the district
courts the power to authorize a sale of the entire property in order to
collect.29 Unlike attachment of the lien, foreclosure of the property is discre-
tionary. 0 This, however, does not give a district court unbridled discretion.
The district courts should exercise their equitable discretion sparingly, keep-
ing in mind the government's paramount need for prompt and certain tax
collection." In the event of a sale, the nondelinquent third party is entitled to
complete compensation for his interest.
32
22. I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1982).
23. Id. See also I.R.C. § 6323(b)(d) (1982) (sets forth claims that have priority over a federal
tax lien); 9 MERTENS, supra note 13, § 54.42.
24. 461 U.S. 677 (1983). Although this decision dealt specifically with the effect of a Texas
homestead interest upon a delinquent taxpayer's property, the court set forth a number of rules
that apply anytime a third party claims an interest in property in which a delinquent taxpayer
also has an interest.
25. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982).
26. I.R.C. § 7403 (1982).
27. See generally id. Attachment of a tax lien will, realistically, hinder the concurrent
owner's ability to alienate his interest. However, because the tax lien only extends to the delin-
quent owner's interest and does not encumber the nondelinquent owner's interest, the nondelin-
quent owner would not be able to maintain an action to quiet title. See Shaw v. United States,
331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964). See also 9 MERTENS, supra note 13, § 54.38, at 126.
28. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 689 (1983).
29. Id. at 690-92.
30. I.R.C. § 6321 states that a lien "shall" attach, where I.R.C. § 7403(c) states that the
district court "may" decree a sale. "Shall" has been interpreted to be a mandate, whereas
"may" has been interpreted to allow the district courts the ability to exercise equitable discre-
tion. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 704-08.
31. The Court noted that where innocent third party interests are at stake, a limited set of
factors should be considered by the district courts. These factors are as follows: The extent to
which the government's interest would be prejudiced by a forced sale of the debtor's partial in-
terest only; whether the third party with a nonliable separate interest in the property has a legally
recognized expectation that the property would not be subject to forced sale by the delinquent
taxpayer; the likely prejudice to the third party in terms of relocation costs; and the relative
character and value of the nonliable and liable interests held in the property. Rodgers, 461 U.S.
at 708-10.
32. The Court noted that had section 7403 allowed for gratuitous confiscation of one
person's property interests in order to satisfy another person's tax liability, it may be violative of
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
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The creation and enforcement of a federal tax lien is a matter of federal
law and state law cannot bar the operation of these sections." However,
federal courts must look to state law to determine the nature of property in-
terests owned by a delinquent taxpayer and any innocent third parties." For
this reason, before the Rodgers decision, a line of cases held that where state
homestead laws expressly provide for a present property interest, conferring
more than merely an exemption," the government may not enforce its tax
lien against the property while the nondelinquent spouse is still in possession
thereof. 6 These courts seem to have deemed the presence of such homestead
interests as situations when district courts should automatically exercise their
equitable discretion.
This line of cases was expressly refuted in Rodgers.3 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit had concluded that if the homestead estate constituted a
property right under state law and was claimed by a nondelinquent spouse,
then it would bar the federal government from pursuing a forced sale of the
entire property." The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that section 7403
was intended to reach the entire property in which a delinquent taxpayer had
any right, title, or interest.3 9 No exception for a homestead interest appears
on the face of the statute and the Court declined to frustrate the policy of the
statute by reading in an exception.40 Furthermore, property rights that attach
to a homestead, of whatever nature, are adequately discharged by the pay-
ment of compensation. No further deference to state law is required by sec-
tion 7403 or the Constitution."'
Therefore, the Supreme Court made it clear that a homestead interest, in
and of itself, will not necessarily create an appropriate situation for a district
the fifth amendment, i.e., taking of property without just compensation. However, to the extent
a third party's interests are taken, section 7403 provides compensation for that taking by requir-
ing the district court to distribute the proceeds of the sale "according to the findings of the court
in respect to the interests of the parties and the United States." Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 695.
33. United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Overman,
424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1947).
34. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51
(1958).
35. It is well settled that state exemption laws do not protect property from federal tax liens
and foreclosure. 9 MERTENS, supra note 13, § 54.52, at 213. See also Michigan v. United States,
317 U.S. 338 (1943); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970); Shaw v. United
States, 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964); Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1947).
36. United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973); Shaw v. United States, 331
F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Morgan, 554 F. Supp. 582 (D. Colo. 1982); Morgan v.
Moynahan, 86 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Tex. 1949).
37. 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
38. United States v. Rodgers, 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd& remanded, 461 U.S. 677
(1983).
39. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 699 (1983).
40. Id. at 700.
41. Id.
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court to invoke its discretion and refuse a sale of the property."2 However,
the presence and nature of a homestead interest is not totally irrelevant. One
of the factors that a district court should consider is the relative character
and value of the liable and nonliable interests held in the property. '3 The
Court suggested that where the nonliable party had a possessory interest of a
high proportionate value, the district court would be justified in refusing to
allow a forced sale.44 Thus, while the exact nature of the homestead interest
is no longer determinative, it will still be important.
Oklahoma Homestead
Oklahoma law creates two distinct homestead interests, often referred to as
the "constitutional homestead ' 45 and the "probate homestead.' '1 6 The con-
stitutional homestead exists during the life of both spouses and is intended to
protect the family from creditors only.47 Probate homestead vests upon the
death of one of the spouses. 48 It gives the surviving spouse (and/or minor
children)'9 a special, individual right of lifetime possession that is intended to
protect the survivor against all persons.50
The exact nature of the interest created by each type of homestead is not
clear; the Oklahoma Supreme Court has referred to them in various ways.
The court has expressly stated that neither is an estate in land.' The constitu-
42. Read narrowly, Rodgers applies only to Texas homestead in that the Supreme Court did
not explicitly state that all states' homestead rights are subject to the decision. However, the only
argument to take a case out of the scope of the decision would be that a state's homestead laws
create stronger property rights than do Texas homestead laws. Texas is one of the few states that
define their homestead interest as an actual estate in property. Johnson v. Commissioner, 718
F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 594, 19 S.W.2d
35, 37 (1929)); Crews v. General Crude Oil Co., 287 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). No
homestead statute could be more protective than this. Therefore, Rodgers should apply to all
states' homestead interest.
43. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 709. See also supra note 31.
44. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 709-10.
45. OKLA. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-3; 31 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-5 (1981).
46. 58 OKLA. STAT. § 311 (1981).
47. Mercer v. Mercer, 365 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1961), citing In re Gardner's Estate, 122 Okla.
25, 250 P. 490 (1926); In re Carothers' Estate, 196 Okla. 640, 167 P.2d 899 (1946); Mitchell v.
Quinton, 189 Okla. 329, 116 P.2d 995 (1941); Gooch v. Gooch, 38 Okla. 300, 133 P. 242 (1913).
48. Two contingencies must occur before a probate homestead will vest; (1) A survivor with
the statutory family status-a spouse or minor child; and (2) an existing occupation of the
premises the survivor intends to continue. In re Wallace, 648 P.2d 828, 832 (Okla. 1982), citing
In re Cole's Estate, 85 Okla. 69, 205 P. 172 (1922).
49. Homestead rights of minor children will not vest until the death of the surviving spouse.
Hembree v. Magnolia Pet. Co., 176 Okla. 524, 531, 56 P.2d 851, 860 (1935).
50. Mercer v. Mercer, 365 P.2d 554, 556 (Okla. 1961); Ringer v. Byrne, 183 Okla. 46, 48, 80
P.2d 212, 214 (1938); In re Gardner's Estate, 122 Okla, 26, 29, 250 P. 490, 492 (1926).
51. Chase v. Chase, 387 P.2d 491, 493 (Okla, 1963) (probate homestead is not an estate in
land); Evans v. Evans, 301 P.2d 232, 234 (Okla. 1956) (neither constitutional nor probate
homestead is an estate in land); Kemp v. Turnbull, 198 Okla. 27, 30, 174 P.2d 385, 386 (1946)
(probate homestead is not an estate in land); Mercer v. McKeel, 188 Okla. 280, 284, 108 P.2d
138, 141 (1940) (constitutional homestead is not an estate in land).
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tional homestead, though a special right vested in both spouses regardless of
who owns title to the property, 2 appears to be merely a privilege of exemp-
tion.5 3 However, the probate homestead seems to be more than a mere ex-
emption right. It has been referred to as a right to continue to occupy and
possess the whole homestead5 4 for the remainder of the survivor's life." This
seems to defime the probate homestead as a possessory interest in property."
According to this interpretation, if the federal government institutes a
foreclosure action before the death of the delinquent spouse, a homestead in-
terest in the nondelinquent spouse would not affect the action. 7 However, if
the foreclosure action is not instituted until after the delinquent spouse's
death, assuming a proper vesting of the probate homestead,58 the nondelin-
quent spouse may be able to prevent a forced sale of the property.
Mere ownership of a possessory interest, such as a probate homestead, will
probably not be sufficient to prevent a sale.5 9 However, if the nondelinquent
surviving spouse can show other factors in addition to a possessory interest,
52. Keel v. Jones, 413 P.2d 549, 551 (1966) (per curiam) (citing Ludeman v. Armbruster, 196
Okla. 452, 165 P.2d 835 (1946); Van Meter v. Field, 195 Okla. 555, 159 P.2d 546 (1945)).
53. In re Wallace, 648 P.2d 828, 832 (Okla. 1982); Evans v. Evans, 301 P.2d 232, 234 (Okla.
1961); Mercer v. McKeel, 188 Okla. 280, 284, 108 P.2d 138, 141 (1940).
54. 31 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (1981) defines what property may constitute homestead property. 58
OKLA. STAT. § 311 (1981) states that the survivor may continue to occupy and possess the
"whole homestead." This refers to the homestead as set forth under 31 OKLA. STAT. § 1.
55. Woods v. Biggs, 424 P.2d 59, 60 (Okla. 1967); Mercer v. Mercer, 365 P.2d 554, 556
(Okla. 1961); Oklahoma State Bank v. Van Hassel, 189 Okla. 48, 50, 114 P.2d 912, 913 (1941);
Ringer v. Byrne, 183 Okla. 46, 48, 80 P.2d 212, 214 (1938); In re Gardner's Estate, 122 Okla. 26,
29, 250 P. 490, 492 (1926).
56. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, when construing the nature of the probate homestead,
has stated that "homestead laws are statutes of exemption." In re Wallace, 648 P.2d 828, 832
(Okla. 1982), citing In re Wineland 3 F. Supp. 796 (D. Okla. 1933), Preston v. Ottawa County
Nat'I Bank, 138 Okla. 133, 280 P. 581 (1929); Rockwood v. St. John's Estate, 10 Okla. 476, 62
P. 277 (1900). However, the cited authority does not support the statement. In Wineland and
Preston the court was construing constitutional, not probate, homestead. In Rockwood the court
was construing probate homestead, but the court simply stated that all exemption laws should be
liberally construed. Although one may infer from this that the court considered the probate
homestead as merely an exemption statute, the issue of the Rockwood case was not what nature
of interest is created by probate homestead. Furthermore, when the court made the statement in
Wallace, it was doing so to draw a distinction between statutes of succession and homestead,
Therefore, even though the court has referred to probate homestead as merely an exemption
statute, it seems to have done so inadvertently.
57. The nondelinquent spouse would still only have a constitutional homestead. Since this is
merely a right of exemption, not rising to the level of a possessory interest, it would have no ef-
fect. See supra notes 35, 43-44 and accompanying text. However, the spouse would be entitled to
complete compensation for the value of his homestead interest. See supra note 32 and accom-
panying text. See also infra note 63 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 48.
59. See United States v. Molina, 584 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. Tex. 1984); United States v.
Bachman, 584 F, Supp. 1002 (S.D. Iowa 1984). In both Molina and Bachman, the district courts
allowed the sale of the entire property, notwithstanding a nondelinquent spouse's homestead in-
terest. In both cases, the nature of the homestead interest was at least a possessory interest. The
courts held that the homestead interest was not, by itself, sufficient to prevent a forced sale.
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the district court may refuse to order foreclosure.60 A number of relevant
factors were suggested in the Rodgers decision. Factors that may be relevant
in this context are:
(1) showing that the delinquent spouse's indebtedness could be satisfied
out of property other than the homestead property;6
(2) showing that the surviving spouse's homestead interest would be ex-
pected to expire in the relatively near future;62
(3) showing that the homestead interest constitutes a high proportion of
the value of the entire property;63 and
(4) showing that the surviving spouse would have a legally recognized ex-
pectation that the property would not be subject to foreclosure to satisfy the
deceased's debts.
64
Few district courts have decided cases involving these issues since the
Rodgers decision. 6 Therefore, exactly how much evidence will be necessary
to prevent foreclosure is not clear. The only guideline currently available is
that the presence of a homestead interest alone, of whatever nature, will not
be sufficient.66 Also, the prejudice to the nondelinquent spouse must
outweigh any possible prejudice to the government. Merely striking a balance
will not be sufficient.
67
Initially, the ability of the federal government to force the sale of property
notwithstanding a nondelinquent spouse's homestead interest may seem a bit
60. See supra note 31.
61. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 708 n.40.
62. Id. at 709 n.41. A homestead interest lapses upon abandonment or death of the surviving
spouse. In re Wallace, 648 P.2d 828, 832 (Okla. 1982). Therefore, where the surviving spouse is
an elderly person, this fact may persuade a district court to postpone foreclosure.
63. The homestead interest is to be valued at the present discounted value of a life estate us-
ing life expectancy tables. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 710. For an extensive review of the method of
valuation, see Note, U.S. v. Rodgers; The Effect of Federal Tax Liens, Foreclosure upon Texas
Homestead, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 858 (1983). A surviving spouse who has a long life expectancy
may be able to establish that the value of the homestead interest is high enough, proportionately,
to prevent foreclosure. However, this will necessarily mean, assuming the spouse intends to oc-
cupy the homestead for the remainder of his life, that the homestead interest may not be ex-
pected to expire in the relatively near future. Thus the second and third factors listed herein may
be at odds with each other in some circumstances.
64. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 709. The Court noted that homestead interests are on the extreme
end of a continuum with regard to the expectations of nondelinquent cotenants. Therefore, the
fact that homestead owners would normally expect their interest to be protected from forced sale
will give them at least a stronger argument against foreclosure than many other concurrent in-
terests, i.e., joint tenants. Id. at 710.
65. See Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Gamble, No. 83-C-0403 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1984) (available
Jan. 2, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); United States v. Molina, 584 F. Supp. 1011
(S.D. Tex. 1984); United States v. Bachman, 584 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. Iowa 1984). The Rodgers
case was remanded to the district court for consideration in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. As of the writing of this note, the district court has not reached a decision on remand.
66. See supra note 59.
67. See United States v. Bachman, 584 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (S.D. Iowa 1984). See also In-
diana Nat'l Bank v. Gamble, No. 83-C-0403 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1984) (available Jan. 2, 1985, on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
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harsh and inequitable. However, section 7403 provides adequate safety
devices to prevent unjust results. Before a sale, there is a judicial determina-
tion of all parties' interests and anyone whose property interest is "taken" is
entitled to complete compensation. 68 Furthermore, a district court may exer-
cise its discretion and, in appropriate cases where a forced sale would be
especially prejudicial, may refuse to order a sale.69 Therefore, the ultimate
resolution of conflicts between section 7403 and state homestead interests is a
fair solution to a delicate problem.
However, there is a logical extension of the Rodgers decision that would
not yield such an equitable result. Attachment of a lien under section 6321 and
foreclosure under section 7403 is not the only means the federal government
has for converting a delinquent taxpayer's property into proceeds for satisfac-
tion of a tax liability. The federal government can also resort to levy and distraint
under sections 6331 through 6340.20
Levy and Distraint
Section 6331 authorizes the federal government to collect delinquent taxes
by levy upon all property and rights to property belonging to a delinquent
taxpayer or on which a lien has attached. 7' Section 6335 provides the pro-
cedural methods for selling such property.72 If any property subject to levy is
not divisible, the entire property may be sold. 73 Section 6334(a) lists property
that is exempt from levy.14 No other property, or rights to property, are ex-
empt except those specifically listed."
Applying the Rodgers rationale, if the government sought to enforce its
lien on property owned by a delinquent spouse, but subject to a homestead
interest of a nondelinquent spouse, under section 6331, levy and distraint, the
property would most likely be sold. A homestead interest does not affect the
attachment of a tax lien, 76 and because the government may levy upon any
property subject to a lien, homestead would not affect a levy either. If the
property subject to levy is not divisible, the whole of the property may be
sold in order to collect the tax. 7 Therefore, as with section 7403, the entire
property may be sold notwithstanding a homestead interest.78 The only pro-
68. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 & 32.
69. See supra notes 31, 62 and accompanying text.
70. I.R.C. §§ 6331-6340 (1982). See 5 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME Ginr AND
ESTATE TAXATION § 73.02 (1984).
71. I.R.C. § 6331 (1982).
72. I.R.C. § 6335 (1982).
73. I.R.C. § 6335(c) (1982).
74. I.R.C. § 6334(a) (1982).
75. I.R.C. § 6334(c) (1982). State-created homestead interests are not within the property in-
terests expressly exempted by this statute.
76. See supra text accompanying note 27.
77. I.R.C. § 6335(c) (1982),
78. However, unlike a sale under section 7403, the property owner retains a right of redemp-
tion under I.R.C. § 6337 when property is sold pursuant to section 6335. See 5 RABKIN &
JOHNSON, supra note 70, § 73.02, at 7311(a).
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perty exempt from levy is expressly set out by statute.9 State-created
homestead interests are not among the property exempted. Where state law
creates an exemption and federal law does not, the supremacy clause allows
the federal government to prevail. 80 Therefore, state-created homestead in-
terests would not prevent levy or sale of property in which a delinquent tax-
payer has any interest.
Although this appears to be the exact result reached in the Rodgers deci-
sion, it is not. Unlike section 7403, judicial foreclosure, sections 6331
through 6340, the levy and distraint provisions, do not provide for either a
judicial determination of all parties' interests or complete compensation for
the property interest of a nondelinquent third party that may be taken to
satisfy delinquent taxes of another. 81
The ramifications of this distinction are evident in Herndon v. United
States.82 In Herndon, Doris Herndon had a homestead interest in property
held in her husband's name. The federal government had a lien on the same
property for delinquent taxes owed by Mr. Herndon. Pursuant to a levy, the
United States proceeded by nonjudicial steps to foreclose its lien by selling
the real property at a public auction. Mrs. Herndon sought an injunction
against the federal government, claiming that her Arkansas homestead in-
terest precluded a sale to satisfy her husband's federal tax liability. The
district court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Mrs.
Herndon's request for an injunction. 83 The Eighth Circuit's ultimate holding
was that under section 6331 the property was subject to tax levy and sale.
84
The court further decided that a state-created homestead interest could not
exempt the property because homestead interests are not among the exemp-
tions listed in section 6334, and federal law controls over state law.85 Finally,
the court concluded that the federal government would be selling the proper-
ty subject to Mrs. Herndon's homestead rights and any prospective buyer
must be advised accordingly.
6
The critical distinction between Herndon and Rodgers is that under section
7403, a nondelinquent spouse who owns a homestead interest in a delinquent
spouse's property will be afforded a judicial determination of his interest and
79. I.R.C. § 6334(a) (1982).
80. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 699. See also Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-1(c) (1954). Here, the Com-
missioner expressly states that property exempted under state homestead laws is nevertheless sub-
ject to levy by the United States for collection of its taxes.
81. The nondelinquent taxpayer's interest technically may not be taken by a levy and
distraint action. In Herndon v. United States, 501 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1974), the court, address-
ing this issue, held that only the delinquent taxpayer's interest was being sold. See infra note 86.
But see infra note 87.
82. 501 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 1220.
84. Id. at 1223.
85. Id. at 1221-24.
86. The court found it unnecessary to determine the nature of Mrs. Herndon's homestead in-
terest because the government was only claiming to sell Mr. Herndon's right, title, and interest,
thereby leaving Mrs. Herndon's homestead interest unimpaired. Thus, the land would be sold
subject to the homestead claim. Id. at 1223.
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awarded compensation if his interest is taken before the federal government
can collect. However, under section 6331, the nondelinquent spouse is not
entitled to a judicial determination of his interest, nor to any compensation
for any encroachment thereon by a forced sale." Yet, the government will
still be able to collect. Furthermore, a party buying such property is at best
buying a lawsuit. This will certainly diminish the price that the government
will be able to obtain from a sale.$$
Simply stated, the federal government is authorized to force a sale of such
property (at a certainly lowered price), to collect the delinquent taxes, and to
leave the purchaser and the nondelinquent spouse to proceed to the courts
and fight over exactly what rights each party has to the property. This is
clearly an unjust result, especially when the federal government could have
proceeded under section 7403 and allowed all parties involved to have their
rights fairly and equitably determined and settled in one proceeding, with all
the safeguards against injustice afforded.
89
Conclusion
Overall, the Supreme Court promulgated limited certainty by its decision
in Rodgers. Stated very generally, a federal lien shall attach, and may be
foreclosed, notwithstanding a homestead interest. Collateral issues, such as
valuation of a homestead and what is necessary to trigger a district court's
equitable discretion, were left relatively flexible, and rightfully so. Each case
involving a tax lien and a homestead may pose the same general issues.
However, the specific details will vary infinitely. Cases of this nature are best
governed by flexible rules.
Homestead owners must be acutely aware that they are not on equal
footing with the federal government. Although the foreclosure statutes are
flexible, Rodgers and succeeding decisions definitely favor foreclosure.
Nevertheless, homestead owners are given their day in court and, even if they
lose the foreclosure issue, all is not lost. They will be compensated for their
loss at the same time the government collects its debt.
Tracey L. Noblitt
87. A question raised, but not answered, in Herndon was whether the homestead interest
would in fact survive the auction sale. A sale of real property under levy and distraint discharges
all liens, encumbrances, and titles upon the property that do not have priority over the federal
tax lien. I.R.C. § 6339(c) (1982). The claims having priority over a federal tax lien are specifical-
ly set out by statute. I.R.C. § 6323(a)(b) (1982). Homestead interests are not listed among these
interests. Therefore, arguably, the homestead interest would not have priority over the federal
tax lien and would be extinguished by a sale of the property pursuant to levy and distraint. In
this event, it seems the nondelinquent spouse would have a strong fifth amendment argument for
taking of property without just compensation. See supra note 32.
88. Herndon, 501 F.2d at 1223-24 (Ross, J., concurring). See also Plumb, Federal Tax Col-
lection and Lien Problems, supra note 12, at 278 n.206.
89. The federal government appears to have an option to enforce its lien under either
foreclosure or levy. However, it has been suggested that where nondelinquent third parties claim
an interest in the property, the foreclosure method is the most appropriate. See Plumb, Federal
Tax Collection and Lien Problems, supra note 12, at 278 n.206.
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